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Abstract
Two fundamental laws are needed for prediction in the universe: (1) a ba-
sic dynamical law and (2) a law for the cosmological initial condition. Quan-
tum cosmology is the area of basic research concerned with the search for a
theory of the initial cosmological state. The issues involved in this search are
presented in the form of eight problems.
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I. WHAT ARE THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS?
Physics, like other sciences, is concerned with explaining and predicting the regularities of
specific physical systems. Stars, the solar system, high-temperature superconductors, fluid
flows, atoms, and nuclei are just some of the many examples. Beyond particular systems,
however, physics aims at finding laws that predict the regularities exhibited universally by all
physical systems — without exception, without qualification, and without approximation.
These are the fundamental laws of physics. This essay is concerned with the fundamental
law for the initial condition of the universe.
Ideas for the nature of the fundamental laws have varied as new realms of phenomena
have been explored experimentally. However, until recently, all of the various ideas for fun-
damental laws have had one feature in common: They were proposals for dynamical laws —
laws that predicted regularities in time. The laws of Newtonian mechanics, electrodynamics,
general relativity, and quantum theory all have this character.
The Schro¨dinger equation is an example of fundamental dynamical law:
ih¯
∂Ψ
∂t
= HΨ . (1.1)
A fundamental theory of dynamics supplies the Hilbert space and the Hamiltonian operator
H . However, a differential equation like (1.1) makes no predictions by itself. To solve
(1.1), an initial condition — the state vector at one moment — must also be given. The
Schro¨dinger equation then expresses the regularities in time that emerge from this initial
state.
Where do the boundary conditions necessary to solve dynamical laws come from? In
most of physics we study the evolution of subsystems of the universe and determine the
boundary conditions by observation or experimental preparation. If we are interested in
the evolution of the electromagnetic field in a room and observe no incoming radiation, we
solve Maxwell’s equations with no incoming radiation boundary conditions. To predict the
probability for the decay of an atom prepared in an excited state, we solve the Schro¨dinger
equation with that excited state as an initial condition at the time of preparation, and so
on. Boundary conditions for the evolution of subsystems are obtained from observations of
the rest of the universe outside the subsystem of interest.
Cosmology, however, presents us with an essentially different problem. The dynamical
laws governing the evolution of the universe — the classical Einstein equation, for instance
— require boundary conditions to yield solutions. But in cosmology, by definition, there
is no “rest of the universe” to pass their specification off to. The cosmological boundary
condition must be one of the fundamental laws of physics.
The inference is inescapable from the physics of the last sixty years that the fundamental
laws are all quantum mechanical. If that is assumed, a theory of the initial condition is a
theory of the universe’s initial quantum state. The search for a fundamental theory of this
initial cosmological quantum state is the aim of that area of basic research which has come
to be called quantum cosmology.
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A view thus emerges that there are two fundamental laws of physics:
• A theory of the basic dynamics,
• A theory of the initial condition of the universe.
Were the universe governed by the Schro¨dinger equation (1.1), the basic theory of dynamics
would specify the Hamiltonian H ; a theory of the initial condition would be a law for the
initial quantum state.
The search for the fundamental dynamical law has been seriously under way since the
time of Newton. Classical mechanics, Newtonian gravity, electrodynamics, special relativity,
general relativity, quantum mechanics, quantum electrodynamics, quantum chromodynam-
ics, electro-weak theory, grand unified theories, and superstring theories are but some of
the important milestones in this search. By contrast, the search for a theory of the initial
condition of the universe has been seriously under way for only a few decades. Why this
difference? The answer lies in the empirical locality of the fundamental interactions on scales
above the Planck length (∼ 10−33cm), or put differently, the empirical fact that the funda-
mental interactions may be effectively described by a local quantum field theory on these
scales. Assuming locality, the Hamiltonian of the whole universe can be deduced from exper-
iments on familiar, laboratory, scales. However, typical ideas for the initial quantum state
of the universe are non-local. They imply regularities in space that emerge mostly on large,
cosmological scales. For example, the temperature of the cosmic microwave background is
the same across the sky to one part in 105, a distance which corresponded to 1020km at the
time the radiation was emitted. It is only the recent progress in observational cosmology
that has given us a picture of the universe on large enough scales of both space and time
that is sufficiently detailed to confront with the predictions of a theory of the initial state
of the universe.
II. QUANTUM COSMOLOGY AND THE EVERYDAY
Can those not interested in regularities on cosmological scales safely ignore the initial
condition of the universe? Not if they seek a fundamental explanation of a number of its
features we ordinarily take for granted. In this section we offer a few examples.
• Isolated Subsystems
In one way we use a very weak theory of the initial condition every day. Many subsystems
of the universe, in the laboratory and elsewhere, are approximately isolated for periods of
time and can can be approximately described by solving the Schro¨dinger equation for the
subsystem alone. In effect, we assume that for the purposes of making predictions about
the subsystem, the wave function of the universe can be approximated by
Ψ(qi, QA, t) ≈ ψ(qi, t)Φ(QA, t) (2.1)
where qi and QA are coo¨rdinates referring to subsystem and the rest of the universe re-
spectively and ψ and Φ evolve separately under the Schro¨dinger equation. But what are
the grounds for such an approximation? They do not lie in the nature of the Hamiltonian
because that generally specifies interactions between all the coo¨rdinates. Rather the ex-
istence of isolated subsystems is a property of the quantum state. In discussing isolated
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subsystems, we are making weak quantum cosmological assumptions about the nature of
this initial state.
• The Quasiclassical Realm
Classical deterministic laws govern a wide range of phenomena in the universe over a
broad span of time, place, and scale. This quasiclassical realm is one of the most immediate
facts of our experience. But indeterminacy and distributed probabilities are the character-
istics of a quantum mechanical universe. Classical deterministic dynamics can be but an
approximation to the unitary evolution of the Schro¨dinger equation and the reduction of the
state vector. To what do we owe the validity of this approximation? In part it arises from
a coarse-grained description with positions and momenta specified to accuracies well above
the limitations of the uncertainty principle for instance. But coarse graining is not enough;
there must also be some restriction on the initial state. Ehrenfest’s theorem is a simple il-
lustration of why. For the motion of a particle in one dimension, Ehrenfest’s theorem relates
the acceleration of the expected position to the expected value of the force:
m
d2〈x〉
dt2
= −
〈
∂V (x)
∂x
〉
. (2.2)
This is generally true, but for certain states, typically narrow wave packets, the right hand
side may be replaced by the force evaluated at the expected position to a good approximation
resulting in the deterministic classical equation of motion
m
d2〈x〉
dt2
≈ −
∂V (〈x〉)
∂x
. (2.3)
Just as only certain states lead to classical behavior in this simple model, so also only certain
cosmological initial conditions will lead to the quasiclassical realm of familiar experience.∗
That too is a feature of the universe that must ultimately be traced to the initial condition.
• Homogeneity of the Thermodynamic Arrow of Time.
Isolated systems evolve towards equilibrium. That is a consequence of statistics. But in
this universe presently isolated systems are mostly evolving towards equilibrium in the same
direction of time. That is the homogeneity of the thermodynamic arrow of time. This is not
a fact which can be explained by statistics or a property of the Hamiltonian alone for that
is approximately time-reversal invariant. The homogeneity of the thermodynamic arrow
of time follows from a fundamental law of the initial condition which mandates that the
progenitors of today’s isolated systems were all far from equilibrium in the early universe.
As Boltzmann put it: “The second law of thermodynamics can be proved from the [time-
reversible] mechanical theory if one assumes that the present state of the universe ... started
to evolve from an improbable state” [2].
• History.
The reconstruction of history is useful for understanding the present in science as well as
in human affairs. For example, we can best understand the character of biological species by
understanding their evolution. We can best explain the present large scale distribution of
∗For a more quantitative discussion see, e.g. [1].
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galaxies by understanding how galaxies arose from tiny density fluctuations present shortly
after the big bang. Such examples could be easily multiplied.
In physics, the reconstruction of history means using the fundamental laws to calculate
the probabilities of alternative past events assuming the values of present records. Classically,
present records alone are enough to calculate those probabilities by using them as the starting
point for running the deterministic classical equations of motion backward in time. To
reconstruct history in quantum mechanics, however, requires a theory of the initial condition
in addition to present records.
The source of this difference between classical and quantum mechanics can be traced to
the arrow of time in usual quantum theory.† Quantum mechanics treats the future differently
from the past. To be sure, the Schro¨dinger equation (1.1) can be run backwards in time as
well as forwards. But the Schro¨dinger equation is not the only law of evolution in quantum
theory. In the usual story, when a measurement is made, the wave function is “reduced” by
the action of the projection operator P representing the outcome of the measurement, and
then renormalized. This is a “second law of evolution”:
Ψ→
PΨ
||PΨ||
. (2.4)
The evolution of the Schro¨dinger equation forwards in time is interrupted by (2.4) on a
measurement. While the Schro¨dinger equation can be run backwards in time, the law (2.4)
cannot, and that is a simple way of seeing the arrow of time in usual quantum mechanics.
The same kind of arrow of time persists in more general quantum theories of closed systems
where (2.4) is effectively used in in the construction of the probabilities of histories which
are not necessarily of the outcomes of measurements.
How then does one calculate the probabilities of past events assuming present records in
quantum mechanics? The simple answer is that one works forwards in time from the initial
state. Evolving forwards using (1.1) and (2.4) one calculates the joint probabilities of both
alternative events of interest in the past and the alternative values of the present records
that follow them. From these one calculates the conditional probabilities of the past events
given our particular present records in the usual way.
This process involves the initial state in an essential way. Strictly speaking, therefore,
one cannot make any statements about the past without a theory of the universe’s initial
condition.
• Phenomenology of the Initial Condition.
While the above four everyday features of the universe are fundamentally traceable to the
universe’s initial quantum state, there is a large set of initial states that would give rise to
them. Put differently, the existence of isolated subsystems together with the applicability of
classical physics, the second law of thermodynamics, and the possibility of historical expla-
nation are not strong constraints on the initial quantum state. Neither are the observations
of large scale features of the universe such as its approximate homogeneity and isotropy or
†There are generalizations of quantum theory without an arrow of time in which the asymmetry
of the usual theory may be understood as a difference between initial and final conditions, e.g. [3].
We shall not consider these here.
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the fluctuations in the cosmic background radiation. The data are meager and the Hilbert
space of the observable universe is vast.
It would be possible to investigate quantum cosmology phenomenologically by asking for
the constraints present observations place on the initial state of the universe. A density
matrix ρ is the way quantum mechanics represents the statistical distribution of states
with associated probabilities that would be inferred. To investigate the initial condition
phenomenologically is therefore to ask for the density matrices consistent with observed
features of the universe.
The observed features of the universe may not uniquely fix an initial condition but
one should not exaggerate their weakness. The density matrix ρ = I/Tr(I), where I is
the unit matrix, is the unique representation of complete ignorance of the initial condition
(i.e. no condition at all). But it also corresponds to infinite temperature in equilibrium
(ρ ∝ exp(−H/kT )) — an initial condition whose implication of infinite temperature today
is obviously inconsistent with present observations.
The entropy S/k = −Tr(ρ log ρ) is a measure of the missing information about the initial
state in a density matrix ρ. Most of the entropy in the matter in the visible universe is in the
cosmic background radiation, a number of order S/k ≈ 1080. As Penrose [4] has stressed,
this is a large number, but infinitesimally small compared to the maximum possible value
of S/k ≈ 10120 if all that matter composed a black hole.
This essay, however, is not concerned with phenomenology. Rather, it is concerned with
the fundamental law of the initial condition. We shall therefore assume that the universe
has a initial state |Ψ〉 and discuss the issues involved in a search for the principles which
determine it.
III. PROBLEMS
Enumerating issues is one way of summarizing the present status of an area of science,
and motivating future research. Certainly, setting problems is a more pleasant task than
solving them, and quantum cosmology is such a young field that it is easier to summarize
problems than to survey accomplishments. It is in this spirit that the author offers the
following eight problems in quantum cosmology:
• Problem 1: What Principle Determines the Initial Condition of the Universe?
The evidence of the observations is that the universe was simpler earlier than it is now —
more homogeneous, more isotropic, with matter more nearly in thermal equilibrium. This
is evidence for a simple, discoverable initial condition of the universe. But what principles
determine that initial state?
The most developed proposal for a principle determining the initial condition is the “no-
boundary” wave function of Stephen Hawking and his associates [5]. The idea is that the
initial condition of a closed universe is the cosmological analog of a ground state. This does
not mean the lowest eigenstate of some Hamiltonian. Intuitively, the total energy of a closed
universe is zero for there is no place outside from which to measure it. Correspondingly the
Hamiltonian vanishes.
But the lowest eigenstate of a Hamiltonian is not the only way to find the ground state
even in the elementary case of a particle moving in a potential V (x). In that case, the
ground state wave function may be expressed directly as a sum over Euclidean paths, x(τ):
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ψ0(y) =
∑
paths x(τ)
exp
(
−I[x(τ)]/h¯
)
(3.1)
where I =
∫
dτ [mx˙2/2+V (x)] is the Euclidean action. The sum is over paths x(τ) that have
the argument of the wave function, y, as one end point, and a configuration of minimum
action in the infinite past as another. Verify it for the harmonic oscillator for example!
This construction of a ground state wave function generalizes to closed universes. For
definiteness suppose, for a moment, that the basic variables of the fundamental dynamical
theory are the geometry of four-dimensional spacetime G, represented by metrics on mani-
folds, together with matter fields such as the quark, lepton, gluon, and Higgs fields which we
generically denote by φ(x). The arguments of cosmological wave functions are these basic
variables restricted to spacelike surfaces, specifically the three-geometries of these surfaces,
3G, and the field configurations on these surfaces, χ(x). The “no-boundary” wave function
is of the form
Ψ0[
3G, χ(x)] =
∑
G,φ(x)∈C
exp
(
−I[G, φ(x)]/h¯
)
(3.2)
where I[G, φ(x)] is the action for gravitation and matter. The “no boundary” wave function
is specified by giving the class C of four geometries G, and matter fields φ(x) summed
over in (3.2). So that the construction is analogous to (3.1), these geometries G should
have Euclidean (signature ++++) and have one boundary at which they match the three-
geometry where the wave function is evaluated. The matter fields must similarly match their
boundary value. The defining requirement is that the G’s have no other boundary, whence
the name “no-boundary” proposal.
Nothing goes on in a typical ground state in a fixed background spacetime. In field
theory, the ground state is the time-translation invariant vacuum! However, this is not the
context of the quantum cosmology of closed universes. Spacetime geometry is not fixed
and there is therefore no notion of time-translation. Interesting histories therefore can
happen; and the attractive nature of gravity makes things happen even in this cosmological
analog of the ground state. In particular, initial, small, quantum, ground state fluctuations
from homogeneity and isotropy that are predicted by this initial condition can grow by
gravitational attraction to produce all the complexity in the universe that we see today.
This prescription for the “no-boundary” wave function is not complete. The reason is
that the action I[G, φ(x)] for gravitation coupled to matter is unbounded below. Were the
sum in (3.2) extended over real, Euclidean geometries and fields, it would diverge! Rather,
the sum must be taken over a class C of complex geometries and fields. A complex contour
of summation is, in fact, essential for the “no-boundary” wave function to predict the nearly
classical behavior of geometry we observe in the present epoch. But many different complex
convergent contours are possibly available and correspondingly there are many different “no-
boundary” wave functions. These do not differ in their semi-classical predictions; but we
still lack a complete principle for fixing this wave function of the universe.
The “no-boundary” idea has been described in terms of an effective theory of dynamics
in which spacetime and matter fields are treated as fundamental variables. If spacetime is
not fundamental, as in string theory or non-perturbative quantum gravity, then extending
the idea to such theories becomes an important question. The essentially topological nature
of the idea gives some hope that such an extension is possible.
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The “no-boundary” wave function is not the only idea for a theory of the initial condition.
Other notable candidates are the “spontaneous nucleation from nothing wave function” [6],
and the ideas associated with the “eternally self-reproducing inflationary universe” [7]. Space
does not permit a review of these and other theories, and the similarities and differences in
their predictions. Discriminating between these and other ideas that may arise is certainly
a problem for the 21st century.
• Problem 2: How Can Quantum Gravity be Formulated for Cosmology?
Gravity governs the evolution of the universe on the largest scales of space and time. That
fact alone is enough to show that a quantum theory of gravity is required for a quantum
theory of cosmology. Were the behavior of the universe on present cosmological scales
all that was of interest, then a low energy approximation to quantum gravity would be
adequate. Indeed most of the exploration of quantum cosmology has been carried out in
such a low energy approximation assuming spacetime geometry and quantum fields are the
basic variables with Einstein’s theory coupled to matter as the basic action. Any divergences
that arise are truncated in one way or another.
It is a reasonable expectation that low-energy, large scale, features of the universe, such
as the galaxy-galaxy correlation function, are insensitive to the nature of quantum gravity
on very small scales. But in quantum cosmology we aim not only at an explanation of such
large scale features, but also at a theory of the initial condition adequate to describe the
probabilistic details of the earliest moments of the universe. The inevitability of an initial
singularity in classical Einstein cosmologies strongly suggests that the earliest moments of
the universe will exhibit curvatures of spacetime characterized by the Planck length
ℓ ≡ (h¯G/c3)1/2 ≈ 10−33cm (3.3)
— the only combination of the three fundamental constants governing relativity, quantum
mechanics, and gravity that has the dimensions of length. By making similar combinations
with the right dimensions we can exhibit the Planck scales of energy and time. The universe
at the epochs characterized by these scales will therefore depend on the detailed form of the
fundamental quantum dynamical law for gravity.
There are a number of candidates for a finite, manageable quantum theory of gravity,
notably superstring theory and non-perturbative canonical quantum gravity. However, nei-
ther of these theories is ready for application to quantum cosmology. String theory, for
instance, exists in a practical sense as a set of rules for classical backgrounds and quantum
perturbations away from them. Developing such theories to the point where they can be
used for the non-perturbative quantum dynamics of closed cosmologies is thus an important
problem.
The problem to be faced is not merely one of technique. Both of the approaches men-
tioned, and others as well, hint that spacetime geometry may not be a basic dynamical
variable. If that is true, it becomes a conceptual issue just how to frame cosmological
questions in the variables of the fundamental dynamical theory.
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• Problem 3: What is the Generalization of Quantum Mechanics Necessary for
Quantum Gravity and Quantum Cosmology?
A generalization of usual quantum mechanics is needed for quantum gravity. That is
because usual quantum mechanics relies in essential ways on a fixed, background spacetime
geometry, in particular, to specify the notion of time that enters centrally into the formalism.
This reliance on a fixed notion of time shows up in any of the various ways of formulating
usual quantum theory — the idea of a state at a moment of time, the preferred role of time
in the Schro¨dinger equation, the inner product at a moment of time, the reduction of the
state vector at a moment of time, the commutation of fields at spacelike separated points,
the equal time commutators of coo¨rdinates and momenta, etc., etc.
But in quantum gravity, spacetime geometry is not fixed, rather it is a quantum dy-
namical variable, fluctuating and generally without definite value. A generalization of usual
quantum theory that does not require a fixed spacetime geometry, but to which the usual
theory is a good approximation in situations when the geometry is approximately fixed,
is therefore needed for quantum gravity and quantum cosmology. What, therefore, do we
mean more generally by a quantum mechanical theory?
The most general objective of any quantum theory is the prediction of the probabilities of
alternative, coarse-grained histories of the universe as a single, closed quantum mechanical
system. For example, one might be interested in predicting the probabilities of the set of
possible orbits of the earth around the sun. Any orbit is possible, but a Keplerian ellipse
has overwhelming probability. Such histories are said to be coarse-grained because they do
not specify the coo¨rdinates of every particle in the universe, but only those of the center of
mass of the earth and sun, and these only crudely and not at every time.
However, the characteristic feature of a quantum mechanical theory is that consistent
probabilities cannot be assigned to every set of alternative histories because of quantum
mechanical interference. Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated than in the famous two-slit
experiment shown in Figure 1. Electrons can proceed from an electron gun at left towards
detection at a point y on a screen along one of two possible histories — the history passing
through the upper slit, A, and the history passing through the lower slit, B. In the usual
story, probabilities cannot be assigned to these two histories if we have not measured which
slit the electron passed through. It would be inconsistent to do so because the the probability
to arrive at y would not be the sum of the probabilities to arrive there going through the
upper slit and lower slit:
p(y) 6= pA(y) + pB(y) (3.4)
because of quantum mechanical interference. In quantum mechanics probabilities are squares
of amplitudes and, of course,
|ψA(y) + ψB(y)|
2 6= |ψA(y)|
2 + |ψB(y)|
2 . (3.5)
A necessary consistency condition would not be satisfied.
A rule is thus needed in quantum theory to specify which sets of alternative histories may
be assigned probabilities and which may not. In the usual, “Copenhagen” formulations of
quantum mechanics presented in textbooks, probabilities can be assigned to the histories of
alternatives of a subsystem that were “measured” by an “observer”. But such formulations
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|Ψ| 2
y
B
A
FIG. 1. The Two-Slit Experiment
are not general enough for quantum cosmology which seeks to describe the early universe
where there were neither measurements nor observers present.
In the more general quantum mechanics of closed systems‡ that rule is simple: probabil-
ities can be assigned to just those sets of alternative histories for which there is vanishing
interference between the individual members as a consequence of the system’s initial state
|Ψ〉. To make this quantitative we need the measure of this interference.
When there is a well-defined fixed notion of time, sequences of alternative sets of events
at a series of times define a set of alternative histories. An individual history in such a set
is a particular series of events, say α ≡ (α1, α2, · · · , αn) at times t1 < t2 < · · · < tn. In usual
quantum mechanics such a history is represented by a corresponding chain of (Heisenberg-
picture) operators,
Cα ≡ P
n
αn(tn) · · ·P
2
α2
(t2)P
1
α1
(t1) , (3.6)
time ordered from right to left. The application of the Cα to the initial state vector |Ψ〉
gives the branch state vector
Cα|Ψ〉 (3.7)
corresponding to the history. Interference vanishes in a set of alternative histories when the
branch state vectors corresponding to the different histories are mutually orthogonal. Sets
of alternative histories with vanishing interference are said to decohere. The probabilities
p(α) of the individual histories in a decoherent set are the squared lengths of the branch
state vectors
‡ For expositions see [8,9].
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p(α) = ||Cα|Ψ〉||
2 . (3.8)
Decoherence insures the consistency of these probabilities.
Interference is thus measured by the decoherence functional:
D(α′, α) =
〈
Ψ|C†α′Cα|Ψ
〉
(3.9)
which becomes the central element in the theory. The condition of decoherence and the
resulting probabilities may be expressed by the single formula
D(α′, α) = δα′αp(α) . (3.10)
The sets of possible coarse-grained histories, their decoherence functional, and (3.10) are
the minimal elements of a quantum theory. A broad framework for quantum theories built
on these elements, called generalized quantum mechanics, can be formulated in terms of
decoherence functionals obeying general principles of Hermiticity, normalization, positivity,
and the principle of superposition [10,11].
Histories represented by strings of projections at definite moments of time (3.6) and a
decoherence functional (3.9) are the way that usual quantum theory implements the prin-
ciples of generalized quantum theory. But there are many other ways, and among them
are possibilities for generalizing usual quantum mechanics so that it works in the absence
of a fixed spacetime geometry. Generalized sum-over-histories quantum theories have been
discussed that put quantum theory into fully spacetime form with four-dimensional notions
of histories, coarse grainings, and decoherence [11]. But the principles of generalized quan-
tum mechanics are only a minimal set of requirements for quantum theory. What further
principles determine the correct quantum mechanics for quantum gravity and quantum cos-
mology?
• Problem 4: What are the Definite Predictions of the Initial Condition for the
Universe on Large Scales?
Extracting the predictions of a theory of the initial condition and comparing them with
observations is a central problem in quantum cosmology. Predictions take the form of
probabilities for present observations. The theory stands or falls on those predictions with
probabilities sufficiently close to one (or zero) being observed (or not observed). These are
called the definite predictions of the theory. We expect few of them. A simple, comprehensi-
ble, discoverable theory of the initial condition cannot predict all the complexity observed in
the present universe with probability near one [12]. Rather, most predictions, as of the stock
market, the weather, or the number of moons of Jupiter, will have more distributed prob-
abilities based on the initial condition alone. (The vast majority will be nearly uniformly
distributed which is no prediction at all.) In quantum cosmology one must search among the
possible predictions for those which are predicted with probability near one. Interestingly,
definite predictions may occur on all scales. For the purposes of simplicity we have divided
the problem of what are the definite predictions of a theory of the initial condition into
problems concerning regularities on cosmological, familiar, and microscopic scales.
Quantum cosmologists expect that a number of the general large scale features of the
universe will be definite predictions of a theory of its initial condition. These include an
approximately classical cosmological spacetime geometry after the Planck epoch, the approx-
imate homogeneity and isotropy of the geometry and matter on scales above several hundred
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megaparsecs§, the approximate spatial flatness of the universe (or what is the same thing
its vast age in Planck units), the initial spectrum of quantum fluctuations which grew to
become the galaxies, a sufficiently long inflationary epoch, and the cosmological abundances
of the matter and radiation species.
The probabilities for these features of the universe arising from various theories of the
initial condition have been explored in highly simplified models valid only in limited regions
of the configuration space of possible present universes. The output of some of these cal-
culations, such as the prediction of the spectrum of initial quantum fluctuations [13], are
among the most successful achievements of quantum cosmology. But much more needs to
be done to extend these calculations to the whole of configuration space with greater accu-
racy, generality and a precise quantum mechanical interpretation. That is a practical and
immediate problem for quantum cosmology.
• Problem 5: What are the Definite Predictions of the Initial Condition for
Features of the Universe on Familiar Scales?
We may treat this problem briefly because the obvious features of the universe on familiar
scales that are traceable to the initial condition have been discussed qualitatively in Section
II. However, those qualitative conclusions raise quantitative questions:
What are the coarse-grained variables defining a quasiclassical realm governed by deter-
ministic laws and how are these variables related to the principle that determines the initial
condition? How refined a quasiclassical description of the universe is possible before deco-
herence is lost or determinism is overwhelmed by quantum noise? How far in space and time
can a quasiclassical description be extended? How do the phenomenological equations of
motion that exhibit the determinism of the quasiclassical realm follow from the fundamental
dynamical law, an initial condition, and an appropriate coarse-grained description? What is
the connection of the coarse graining used to define a quasiclassical realm with that which
is necessary to exhibit a second law of thermodynamics? How far out of equilibrium is the
early universe in this coarse graining?
In short, a theory of the initial condition presents the challenge of defining quantitatively
those features of the universe on familiar scales which are traceable, in part, to the nature
of the initial condition.
• Problem 6: What are the Definite Predictions of the Initial Condition on
Microscopic Scales
Our understanding of the world on microscopic scales above that set by the Planck
length is summarized by the effective field theories which govern phenomena on these scales
— for example, the standard model of elementary particle physics. However the forms of
these effective field theories may be only distantly related to the form of the fundamental
dynamical law. An analogous situation at a different scale may help explain why: The form of
the Navier-Stokes equation which governs the dynamics of much of the quasiclassical realm
is not easily guessed from the Lagrangian of the standard model of particle physics. In
particular, the Navier-Stokes equation incorporates dissipation and depends on constitutive
relations between density, pressure, temperature, viscosity, etc. — relations not contained
§ The megaparsec is a convenient unit for cosmology. One megaparsec is 3.3 million light years.
The size of the visible universe is several thousand megaparsecs.
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in the Lagrangian of the standard model.
Of course, we understand qualitatively the relation between the laws of the standard
model and the Navier-Stokes equation. The Navier-Stokes equation applies, not generally,
not exactly, but only approximately in particular circumstances. It is effective equation with
a limited range of approximate validity. In quantum mechanics particular circumstances are
represented by the quantum state and a coarse-grained description. It is the quantum state
whose special properties allow a classical approximation, set up the conditions for dissipation,
determine the constituents, and allow for the local equilibrium from which the constitutive
relations follow.
But the standard model itself may be only an effective approximation to a more fun-
damental dynamical law such as heterotic superstring theory or non-perturbative quantum
gravity. We may therefore restate the problem of the definite predictions of the initial
condition as follows: What features of the effective dynamical laws that govern
the elementary particle system at accessible energy scales are traceable to the
cosmological initial condition and what to the fundamental dynamical law? For
instance, what is the origin of the locality of the effective interactions in a theory of the
quantum state that is intrinsically non-local?
The investigations of the effects of wormholes by Hawking, Coleman, Giddings and Stro-
minger, and others indicate just how strong the effect of the initial condition on the effective
interactions could be (for a review see, e.g. [14]). Suppose that the sum over geometries
defining the “no-boundary” wave function in (3.2) includes a sum over wormhole geometries
— four dimensional geometries with many “handles” rather like a teacup has a handle. Sup-
pose that the Planck scale (3.3) is the characteristic size of these wormholes in the geometries
that contribute the most to the sum. Fields propagating in such geometries can go down a
wormhole and emerge from one. On the much larger scales accessible to us, we would see
the effect of Planck scale wormholes as local interactions which create and destroy particles.
The net effect is to add to any local Lagrangian an infinite series of local interactions with
coupling constants that are not fixed once and for all by the fundamental dynamical law or
even by a renormalization procedure, but rather vary probabilistically with a distribution
determined by the initial condition. If the distribution was sharp (as was hoped for the
cosmological constant) then the couplings would be predicted.
A similar decoupling between the observed coupling constants and the basic Lagrangian
would hold if the initial condition predicted domains of space much larger than our visible
universe in which breaking of the symmetries of the fundamental dynamical law occurred in
different ways in different places leading to a differing effective theories in different domains.
The form of the effective theory governing our domain would then be only a probabilistic
prediction of the fundamental dynamical law.
It has proved difficult to push such ideas very far, but their lesson is clear. The form and
couplings of the effective interactions at accessible scales may be probabilistically distributed
in a way which depends on the initial condition. Finding these distributions and how sharp
they are is therefore an important problem in quantum cosmology.
• Problem 7: What Does Quantum Cosmology Predict for IGUSes?
Most of predictions of the initial condition that we have considered so far are described
in terms of alternatives of the quasiclassical realm. But there are many sets of decohering
histories of the universe arising from a theory of its initial condition and dynamics that have
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nothing to do with the usual quasiclassical realm. These sets may be quantum mechanically
incompatible with each other and with the usual quasiclassical realm in the sense that pairs
of them cannot be combined into a common decohering set. Such incompatible sets are not
contradictory; rather they are complementary ways of viewing the unfolding of the initial
condition into alternative histories. The quantum mechanics of closed systems does not
distinguish between such incompatible sets of alternative histories except by properties such
as their classicality. All are in principle available for the process of prediction.
Yet, as observers, we describe the universe almost exclusively in terms of the familiar
variables of classical physics. What is the reason for this narrow focus in the face of all
the other non-quasiclassical decohering sets of alternative histories? Some see this disparity
between the possibilities allowed by quantum theory and the possibilities utilized by us as
grounds for augmenting quantum mechanics by a further fundamental principle that would
single out one decohering set of histories from all others [15]. That is an interesting line of
thought, but another is to seek an explanation within the existing quantum mechanics of
closed systems.
Human beings, bacteria, and certain computers, are examples of information gathering
and utilizing systems (IGUSes). Roughly, an IGUS is a subsystem of the universe that
makes observations and thus acquires information, makes predictions on the basis of that
information using some approximation (typically very crude) to the quantum mechanical
laws of nature, and exhibits behavior based on these predictions.∗∗ To explain why IGUSes
are exhibited by the universe, or why they behave the way they do, or to answer questions
like “Why do we utilize quasiclassical variables?”, one must seek to understand how IGUSes
evolved as physical systems within the universe. In quantum cosmology that means exam-
ining the probabilities of a set of histories that define alternative evolutionary tracks. For
IGUSes that can be characterized in terms of alternatives of the usual quasiclassical realm,
it is a plausible conjecture that they evolved to focus on the usual quasiclassical alternatives
because these present enough regularity over time to permit prediction by relatively simple
models (schemata). This would be one kind of explanation of why we utilize the usual qua-
siclassical realm. However, we should not pretend that we are close to being able to carry
out a calculation of the relevant probabilities or even likely to be in the early 21st century!
But what of sets of histories that are completely unrelated to the usual quasiclassical
realm? Might some of these exhibit IGUSes with high probability that make predictions
in terms of variables very different from the familiar quasiclassical ones? Or is the usual
quasiclassical realm somehow distinguished with respect to exhibiting IGUSes? To answer
such questions one would need a general characterization of IGUSes that is applicable to all
kinds of histories — not just quasiclassical ones — and an ability to calculate the probabilities
of various courses of the IGUSes’ evolution. Such questions, while quite beyond our power to
answer in the present, illustrate the range of predictions in principle possible in a quantum
universe from a fundamental theory of dynamics and the initial condition of the universe.
∗∗IGUSes are complex adaptive systems in the context of quantum mechanics. For more on the
general characterization of complex adaptive systems see [16].
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IV. UNIFICATION
The universal laws that govern the regularities of every physical system are one goal of
physics. A fundamental dynamical law is one objective. Quantum cosmology is concerned
with the equally necessary fundamental law specifying the initial condition of the universe.
Historically, many of the advances towards the fundamental laws have had in common
that some idea that was previously thought to be universal was subsequently seen to be only
a feature of our special place in the universe and the limited range of our experience. With
more data, the idea was seen to be a true physical fact, but one which is a special situation
in a yet more general theory. The idea was a kind of “excess baggage” which had to be
jettisoned to reach a more general, more comprehensive, and more fundamental perspective
[17].
It is not difficult to cite examples of such excess theoretical baggage in the history of
physics: the idea that the earth was the center of the universe, the idea of Newtonian absolute
time, the idea that the increase entropy was a basic dynamical law, the idea that spacetime
geometry is fixed, the idea of a classical world separate from quantum mechanics, etc. etc.
Further, and more importantly for the present discussion, one can cite examples concerning
the nature of the fundamental laws themselves: the idea that thermodynamics was separate
from mechanics, the idea that electricity was separate from magnetism, and more recently
the idea that there were separate weak and electromagnetic interactions. These seemingly
distinct theories were eventually unified. Today, extrapolations of the standard model of the
electro-weak and strong interactions suggest a unified theory of these forces characterized
by an energy scale a little below the Planck scale.
Examples such as those just cited have led some physicists to speculate that the existing
separation between the dynamical laws for the gravitational and other forces is also an
example of excess baggage arising from the limitations of present experiments to energies
well below the Planck scale, and to search for a unified fundamental law for dynamics of all
the forces. Secure in the faith that fundamental laws are mathematically simple, heterotic
superstring theory or its extensions have been the inspiring results.
However, such a unified dynamical law does not really deserve the common designation
of “a theory of everything” or a “final theory”. Quantum cosmology offers a further oppor-
tunity for unification beyond dynamical laws. Could it be that the apparent division of the
fundamental laws into a law for dynamics and a law for an initial quantum state is a kind
of excess baggage similar to those described above? Gell-Mann [18] has stressed that there
is already an element of unification in ideas such as the “no-boundary” proposal. In (3.2)
the same action that determines fundamental dynamics also determines the quantum state
of the universe. Despite this connection, the “no-boundary” proposal is a separate principle
specifying one wave function out of many possible ones. Thus we have an eighth problem
for quantum cosmology:
• Problem 8: Is there a Fundamental Principle that would Single Out Both a
Unified Dynamical Law and a Unique Initial Quantum State for the Universe?
Could that same Principle Single Out the Form of Quantum Mechanics from
Among Those Presented by Generalized Quantum Theory?
In such a unification of the law of dynamics, the cosmological boundary condition, and
the principles of quantum mechanics, we would, at last, have a truly unified fundamental
14
law of physics governing the universe as a whole and everything within it. That is truly a
worthy problem for physics in the twenty-first century!
V. FURTHER READING
Ref [19] is Scientific American article introducing quantum cosmology. An accessible but
more advanced introductory review is [20]. That article contains a nearly exhaustive list of
references at the time and a guide to the literature. For an introduction to the quantum
mechanics of closed systems, see e.g. [8]. For an exposition of the applications of quantum
mechanics to cosmology see [11].
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